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This study consolidates the state of academic research using agency theory to 
explain the various phenomena’s in the multinational firm’s (MNCs) context. Based 
on the systematic review of the literature, the author finds that agency theory is 
used to examine the degree of internationalization, international diversification, 
born global internationalization, and governance issues in various modes of for-
eign entries. The author classifies the literature in three broad themes: corporate 
governance, firm ownership, and born global firms. Agency theory is also used to 
examine the impact of top management characteristics, board structure, ownership 
by domestic investors, foreign investors, business group firms, family ownership, 
and state ownership on the firm internationalization decisions. The study concludes 
with the research gaps and future research directions.
Keywords: Agency Theory, Internationalization, Systematic Review, Ownership,  
Top Management Team, Board of Directors
1. Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed explosive research on the corporate 
governance of multinational firms (MNCs). The performance of MNCs is based on 
four commonly held arguments in the literature. First, MNCs can achieve econo-
mies of scale with their knowledge of specific asset exploitation at a larger scale 
[1]. Second, the internalization of the activities within the firm reduces the agency 
problem in the MNCs [2, 3]. Third, MNCs can get financial resources at the lowest 
possible cost in the international market [4, 5]. Finally, MNCs have strong corporate 
governance mechanisms to maximize the firm value [6, 7]. Earlier studies in the 
international business literature have been more concerned with the internalization 
theory to efficiently control the resource allocation to minimize the transaction cost 
[8]. Buckley and Strange [8] called for use of the agency theory to understanding 
the governance issue in the MNCs with the inclusion of the strategic and behavioral 
aspects of the various stakeholders in the different country contexts.
This study reviews the literature on MNCs using the agency theory. The author 
finds that agency theory is used to examine the degree of internationalization, 
international diversification, born global internationalization, and governance 
issues in various modes of foreign entries. Agency theory is used to analyze the 
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impact of top management characteristics, board structure, ownership by domes-
tic investors, foreign investors, business group firms, family ownership, and state 
ownership on the firm internationalization decision. Board internationalization 
and diversity impact the internationalization decision of the firms. TMT inter-
nationalization is positively related to the accounting quality of the MNCs. High 
competition in the international context mitigates the agency cost incurred by 
reducing the CEO’s opportunistic actions and the CEO pay structure is also used 
to mitigate the agency cost in MNCs. The ownership structure of the MNCs has 
a strong impact on MNCs strategic actions. Ownership by institutional owners is 
positively related to firm internationalization due to their active monitoring and 
international experience. Foreign corporate and institutional ownership was also 
found to be positively associated with firm internationalization. State owner-
ship has an interesting set of two agency conflicts and has scope for empirical 
examination.
Further section discusses the article’s selection and review strategy. Descriptive 
analysis of the articles provides information regarding the year-wise, context-wise, 
journal wise and methodology-wise description of the reviewed articles. Further, 
the author synthesizes the finding from the literature review and provides an 
integrated discussion. The final section of the paper discusses the research gaps and 
future research agenda.
2. Literature review strategy and sample selection
2.1 Review method
This study uses a systematic literature review to integrate the existing litera-
ture on agency theory advancement in the context of international business. The 
systematic method of the literature review was proposed by Tranfield et al. [9] in 
medical science literature, to overcome the criticism of the traditional literature 
review. A traditional literature review involves the subjectivity and bias of the 
researcher. The main objective of the systematic literature review is to identify 
research key contributions in a field and descriptively present and discuss them.
There are two important steps in the systematic literature review:
• Define the inclusion criterion of the primary studies
• Identify data sources and selection of studies
2.1.1 The inclusion criteria
This study uses the following criteria to include review articles:
• The study should use agency theory to explain the internationalization 
phenomenon
• This study only includes peer-review journal articles to ensure the quality of 
literature
• This study includes articles published in “B” or above category journals accord-
ing to ABDC journal ranking. This ensures the quality publications toward the 
theoretical advancement of the phenomenon.
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2.1.2 Study selection and data source
This study uses Business Source Ultimate of the EBSCO database to find the 
relevant articles. The focus of the study was on top ranked international business 
journals. EBSCO includes all the top ranked journals in the field of international 
business which includes top international business journals indexed in Web of 
Science or Scopus databases. The author uses a combination of the keywords: 
agency and internationalization to find the relevant articles. The search using these 
keywords in title, abstract, and author keyword in the database yielded a total of 
132 articles. Further, the author removes duplicate and below B category journal 
articles (as per ABDC ranking) and finds 59 articles for further use in the study. The 
author read the abstract and the introduction of these 59 articles whenever required 
to find relevant studies. Finally, the author finds 24 relevant articles that meet the 
objective of the study. Table 1 lists all the review studies with journal name, the 
theory used, country or context, method (qualitative/ quantitative), and analytical 
techniques.
3. Findings and discussion
3.1 Descriptive analysis
This section discusses various descriptive characteristics of the review articles. 
There is an increasing trend of publication of studies using agency theory to study 
MNCs. Figure 1 shows an increasing trend of using agency theory in the context 
of firm internationalization after 2010. Figure 2 shows that review studies are 
published in various management journals. The highest number of publications 
from the sample studies are from the International Business Review and Journal of 
Business Research. Most of the sample studies have integrated agency theory with 
the resource-based view, resource dependency theory, and institutional theory (see 
Table 2). Firm internationalization is a complex process and requires more than 
one theory to explain the underlying phenomenon. Most of the articles are based 
on a single institutional or country context (see Figure 3). Most of the articles are 
empirical and primarily use a diverse set of quantitative techniques (see Table 3).
3.2 Corporate governance and agency theory
As per the agency perspective, the divergence of interest between the principal 
and agent causes opportunistic behavior by agents to maximize their utility and 
reduces the shareholders’ value [34]. Firms use several governance mechanisms to 
mitigate agency costs such as monitoring by the board of directors [35], and high 
ownership by outsiders [36]. There exist internal as well as external mechanisms to 
control the agency problem [25]. Internal governance mechanism is such as CEO 
compensation alignment with the shareholders’ value maximization [37]. The 
external mechanism is market control such as the threat of takeover, and competi-
tion in the labor and product market [38]. Further, this study divides the literature 
into various themes.
3.2.1 Board of Directors (BOD)
BOD has the roles of managing the top management’s hiring to firing, provid-
















Author Publication Title Theory Context Quantitative/
Qualitative
Analytical Method
Chen et al. [10] International Business Review Agency Theory, RDP Taiwan Quantitative Panel Fixed Effect
Toledo et al. [11] Journal of Business Research Agency Theory, RBV Mexico Quantitative Partial correlation
LiPuma [12] Journal of Business Research Agency Theory USA Quantitative OLS
Singla et al. [13] Journal of Business Research Agency Theory, RBV India Quantitative GLS Random Effect
Mersland et al. [14] International Business Review Agency Theory, RBV 73 developing countries Quantitative SUR
Dauth et al. [15] International Business Review Agency Theory, UEP, Human capital 
theory
Germany Quantitative Pooled OLS
Elosge et al. [16] International Business Review Agency Theory, IBV, and UEP Germany Quantitative 3SLS-GLS
Hooghiemstra et al. 
[17]





European Journal of Marketing Agency Theory UK Qualitative Case Study
Saeed et al. [19] Cross Cultural & Strategic 
Management
Agency Theory, RDP China and India Quantitative Tobit
Zhou et al. [20] Management Decision Agency Theory, IBV China Quantitative Logit
Sanders and 
Carpenter [21]




USA Quantitative OLS, Logit, Poisson
Zahra [22] Corporate Governance: An 
International Review
Agency Theory Conceptual
V. Z. Chen [23] Corporate Governance: An 
International Review
Agency Theory, RDP USA Quantitative Probit
Cuervo-Cazurra et 
al. [24]










































Author Publication Title Theory Context Quantitative/
Qualitative
Analytical Method
Tihanyi et al. [26] Academy of Management Journal Agency Theory, FDI theory USA Quantitative Hierarchical linear
Chang et al. [27] European Financial Management Agency Theory USA Quantitative OLS, Poisson, Negative 
Binomial
Gaur and Delios [28] Management International Review Agency Theory, IBV India Quantitative GLS Random Effect
Ray et al. [29] Global Strategy Journal Agency Theory, SEW India Quantitative GLS Random Effect
Benito et al. [30] Journal of Management Studies Agency Theory, RBV, and IBV Norway Quantitative GLS Random Effect
Shi et al. [31] Journal of International Business 
Studies
Agency Theory, IBV, and Bonding 
theory
USA Quantitative Probit
Tsao and Chen [32] Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management
Agency Theory Taiwan Quantitative GLS Random Effect
Tsao and Lien [33] Management International Review Agency Theory Taiwan Quantitative GLS Random Effect
Note: RDP (resource dependence perspective), RBV (resource-based view), IBV (institution-based view), UEP (upper echelon perspective), FDI (foreign direct investment), SEW (socioemotional wealth), 
GLE (generalized least square), OLD (ordinary least square), SUR (seemingly unrelated regression), 3SLS (three stage least square).
Table 1. 
Review articles description.
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the firm strategy [17]. Various studies have found the link between the board 
composition and characteristics with firm internationalization decisions such as 
diversification, innovation, and acquisition [25]. Hooghiemstra et al. [17] studied 
the impact of board internationalization on the monitoring quality of the board. 
They proposed that the internationalization of the board make communication 
difficulties due to language and culture difference. This impacts the perception of 
the individual director toward earning management. Board internationalization 
cause difficulties in the understanding of accounting laws of the host nation and 
reduce the quality of monitoring. Foreign directors are found to be less influenced 
by management. The lack of country-specific accounting knowledge and a language 
barrier in the board meeting causes less effective monitoring which causes high 
earning management.
Figure 1. 
Year-wise publication trend in sample studies.
Figure 2. 
Journal-wise publication trend in sample studies.
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Board diversity is also an emerging issue in the governance literature. Saeed  
et al. [19] studied the impact of ownership on women’s presence on the board in 
the emerging economies context of India and China. They found that women’s 
presence on the board is negatively related to the family and state ownership in the 
firm. Firm internationalization has a positive impact on the independence of the 
female BOD. As per the resource dependence theory [39], the presence of female 
directors motivates the female employee in the firm and increases the legitimacy 
of the firm in the international context. The diverse board provides a pool of skills 
and knowledge to make a better decision [19]. In the emerging economies context, 
board diversity has different implications as compared to developed economies. 
Emerging economies have weak legal protection, less defined property rights, and 
Theory Used No of Articles
Agency theory 8
Agency theory, RBV 3
Agency theory, RDP 3
Agency theory, SEW 1
Agency theory, Internalization theory 1
Agency theory, FDI theory 1
Agency theory, Information-processing theory 1
Agency theory, IBV 1
Agency theory, IBV 1
Agency theory, IBV, and Bonding theory 1
Agency theory, IBV, and UEP 1
Agency theory, RBV, and IBV 1
Agency theory, UEP, Human capital theory 1
Grand Total 24
Table 2. 
Theory used in the sample studies.
Figure 3. 
Context-wise publication trend in sample studies.
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the infrastructure is also not well developed. State-owned firms have high govern-
ment influence due to top management appointed by the state. The politics in the 
male-dominated arena of the emerging economies hurt the selection of the female 
members on the board [19].
The independence of the directors from the top management team reduces 
the cost of an agency. The independent director has the human and social skills to 
influence the firm internationalization decisions [26]. Chen et al. [10] examine a 
sample of US manufacturing firms and find that directors’ independence provides 
appropriate resources and information’s in multinational firms. Integrating agency 
theory with the resource dependence view, they argue that independent directors 
possess international experience in the specific industries with the interlocking ties 
which increase firm willingness to internationalize.
3.2.2 Top management team (TMT)
The agency theory is used to explain the divergence of interest between the 
top management team (as agent) and shareholders (as principals). Agency theory 
literature is well developed to explain the actions and behavior of the TMT and 
the opportunistic decision by the managers to maximize their benefits [16]. 
Internationalization increases competition in the industry from the domestic as well 
as foreign multinational firms. This increased competition increases the TMT focus 
on the decision to improve the firm value and reduce the agency conflict [27].
CEO (chief executive officer) pay structure is used to mitigate the agency prob-
lem by aligning the owner-managers interest. In the international business context, 
a contingent pay structure of the CEO can increase her/his effort in managing the 
complexity and get the rewards [25]. Higher and Long term based CEO pay can 
Research Method No of Articles
Qualitative 1
Quantitative 20
Conceptual and Review 3
Analytical Technique No of Articles
3SLS-GLS Regression 1
Case Study 1




Panel Fixed Effect 1







Research method used in the sample studies.
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reduce the agency cost and increase information processing in the multinational 
context [21]. Elosge et al. [16] examined the role of CEO succession on the German 
firm’s internationalization. They combine agency theory, institutional theory and 
upper echelons approach to identify CEO succession influence on internationaliza-
tion decisions. They find that CEO succession leads to higher firm internationaliza-
tion. The new CEO tries to peruse the legitimacy and try to maximize the personal 
benefit by international diversification. This positive impact is reduced after a 
threshold of the CEO changes due to the disturbance caused in the firm’s manage-
ment. Finally, they found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between CEO succes-
sion and internationalization.
Dauth et al. [15] integrated upper echelons perspective, agency theory, and 
human capital theory to examine the impact of TMT internationalization on 
accounting quality. They found that TMT internationalization improves the 
accounting quality and the effect size is small in the case of CFO (chief financial 
officer) internationalization compare to CEO. TMT internationalization help in 
coping with the complex accounting standards and reduce the incentive to exert 
earning discretion.
3.3 Ownership and agency
Existing studies show that the ownership structure of the firms influences the 
firm’s decision-making and behavior of risk-taking [40]. Emerging economies firms 
also face the principal-principal agency issue [41, 42]. Heterogeneity of the strategic 
preferences among the institutional investors is established in the existing studies 
[26, 40, 43]. This section reviews the studies using agency theory to establish the 
link between the ownership structure and internationalization decisions.
3.3.1 Domestic ownership
Domestic ownership includes ownership by domestic individuals, corporates, 
and institutions. Singla et al. [13] examined the role of domestic corporate owner-
ship on internationalization. This corporate invest in the other firms and form 
a cross-holding and pyramidal ownership structure. This improves the relative 
competitiveness of the firm in the home market by reducing the supply and demand 
uncertainty and providing access to resources. Tihanyi et al. [26] study the impact 
of institutional ownership on the US firm’s international diversification. They find 
that institutional investors (professional investment funds and pension funds) have 
a long-term interest in the firm and they effectively monitor the manager’s action 
due to their large ownership. The long-time horizon and risk-taking behavior of the 
institutional investors increase the focal firm’s international diversification.
Zhou et al. [20] integrated agency theory with the institution-based view 
to understanding the relationship between institutional ownership and cross-
border acquisition success in Chinese firms. They find that institutional owner-
ship improves firms’ governance quality and acquisition success. They are more 
informed to evaluate the cross-border acquisitions decisions by the firms and their 
large shareholding incentives to monitors the other shareholders and managers 
active in the acquiring firms.
3.3.2 Foreign ownership
It includes ownership by foreign corporations and institutional investors. 
Ray et al. [29] argued that the high foreign institutional ownership reduces the 
fear of complex unknown practices in the international market by improving 
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understanding of the foreign market based on their international experience. They 
found that foreign corporate and institutional ownership is positively associated 
with firm internationalization. Foreign corporate investors are not only moti-
vated by financial goals but also want to enter into the new market and develop 
organizational capabilities [13]. In the emerging market multinational firms the 
foreign institutional help in building credibility and reputation in the foreign 
market. Institutional investors are active monitors and sent a positive signal of 
good governance in the focal firms. In sum, institutional ownership is positively 
associated with firm internationalization [13]. Foreign investors are also associated 
with the high commitment entry modes selection by the firms [25]. Mersland et 
al. [14] examined the influence of microbanks internationalization on their social 
and financial performance. Internationalization of the microbanks helps in getting 
international BOD, international debt access, international network access which 
improves their social performance.
3.3.3 Business group ownership
Business group ownership is very dominant in the emerging economies context 
such as India. Gaur and Delios [28] integrated agency theory with institutional 
theory to examine the impact of international diversification on firm performance. 
They examined a sample of Indian multinationals and found that high domestic and 
foreign ownership is positively associated with the firm international diversification. 
They found a negative impact on firms’ international diversification of financial 
performance. Business group affiliation positively moderated the relation between 
the firm international diversification and financial performance. The group affili-
ated firms have a less negative impact of international diversification of the firm’s 
performance due to the resource availability support in the affiliated firms.
3.3.4 Family ownership
There are various definitions of family firms in the literature. Ray et al. [29] 
defined family firms as “firms given founding business have a shareholding of 20% 
or more with a director position by founding family members and at least a member 
from the founding firm is managing director/CEO/board chairperson”. Tsao and 
Lien [33] defined family firms as “firms in which the founders or their family mem-
bers hold the key management positions, sit on the board, or are the block-holders 
of the firm”. Singla et al. [13] examined the impact of family ownership on firms’ 
internationalization. Based on the principal-principal (PP) agency theory and the 
resource-based view they argue that the various shareholders have different prefer-
ences and favor firm internationalization differently. They find that a lower level of 
family ownership is positively associated with firms’ internationalization while a 
higher level does not favor internationalization.
Ray et al. [29] investigated the influence of family management and ownership 
on firm internationalization decisions in emerging economies (India). They inte-
grated the “socioemotional wealth perspective and agency theory” to examine the 
relationship. They adopted the willingness and ability perspective [44] to establish 
the relationship. Where the willingness is related to “disposition to act” and ability 
is related to “discretion to act”. The family firms have less willingness to take the risk 
and lower internationalization. The risk aversion of the family firms is more strong 
with the control of the increase as they have ownership as well as management 
position in the affiliated firms. The family members can influence the manager’s 
actions. The negative impact of family ownership on internationalization is reduced 
with higher foreign institutional ownership.
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Tsao and Lien [33] examined the moderating role of family ownership on firm 
internationalization and innovation/performance. They took a sample of Taiwan’s 
publicly listed firms and find that family firm’s experience positively moderate the 
relationship between internationalization and innovation/performance. The pres-
ence of the family management mitigates the agency due to high family firm control 
over firm strategic actions. The family firm has principal-principal agency conflict 
with the minority shareholders.
3.3.5 State ownership
In the case of state-owned firms, the two-agency relationship exists [24]. 
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. [24] listed triple agency conflict in state-owned enterprises 
internationalization as follow:
• First, these firms are having the owners as the citizen of the nation who 
appoints the politicians as the agent. The firms have certain social and 
economic goals. In these settings, the citizens as the principals do not have 
contractual control mechanism overs the politician as the agent. The politician 
once selected are replaced after the next election only. The conflict arises when 
politician maximize own utility to remain in power and citizens want a better 
return for their investment
• The second agency issue is between the politician and the appointed firm’s 
managers. Agency conflict occurs when politician want to achieve their 
personal goals while the managers maximize their benefits [45]
• A third agency relationship exists between the managers of the state-owned 
enterprises and the managers of their foreign subsidiary [46]
All three principals have different objectives:
• citizens have the objective of the country development
• Politician wants to remain in the power
• Foreign subsidiary managers want to advance their carrier
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. [24] proposed that the state-owned multinationals firms 
invest and enter into the countries where their project value is less than the private 
multinational with less agency cost. Benito et al. [30] have examined the impact of 
state ownership on the headquarter reallocation by the multinationals outside the 
home market. Integrating agency theory, resource-based view, and institutional 
perspectives, they argued that location decisions about the multinational head-
quarters are based on the efficiency and the legitimacy factors. They find that state 
ownership along with concentrated ownership is negatively related to the head-
quarters location outside the home country. They proposed that the location of the 
headquarters outside the home country negatively impacts the image of the home 
country and causes a loss in employment and R&D.
3.4 Born global and agency issues
The early-stage internationalization of the new ventures provides them growth 
and profitability opportunity. The governance challenges are serious in the born 
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global firms [22]. Zahra [22] examined the impact of public and corporate gov-
ernance on the global entrepreneurial firms as the early internationalizes. These 
governance systems decide the success and survival of the born global in the 
international market. The born global firm faces issues regarding the management 
of intellectual property rights and free-riding by the established players. Public and 
corporate governance resolve cross-border conflicts. Corporate governance effec-
tively monitors the manager’s actions as well as supports the decision-making in the 
complex global context.
LiPuma [12] examined the performance of the IPO performance by born global. 
Using a sample of the technology-based international new ventures he argued that 
the agency risk is higher due to the difficult monitoring and the communication 
in the born global. Born global have high liabilities of the foreignness due to less 
experience in the international context. He found that the timing of IPO is later in 
born global firms in comparison to the domestic firms.
4. Conclusion
This study consolidates the state of academic research on using agency theory 
to explain the various phenomena’s in the MNCs context. Based on the systematic 
review of the literature, author finds that agency theory is used to examine the 
degree of internationalization, international diversification, born global interna-
tionalization, and governance issues in various modes of foreign entries.
4.1 Future research directions
A large number of opportunities exist in future research to examine various 
aspects of agency in the different contexts of MNCs. First, the impact of business 
group affiliation on the MNCs performance is inconclusive [28]. These studies 
suggest heterogeneity among the business group in different institutional contexts 
and require separate attention. Second, several studies emphasized the board 
characteristics impact on the agency issues and firm internationalization. But, 
the black box of what happens inside the board room is not well understood and 
requires attention to understand it using methods such as video recording of board 
room activities [17]. Third, future research needs to identify the heterogeneity 
among the family firms based on the composition of the family members team, 
knowledge resource and networks difference with family members, dynamics in 
the family, and intergenerational issues in the context of the emerging economies 
family firms. Forth, current studies have considered principal-principal conflict 
based on the financial goals of the various owners. Future studies need to consider 
the multidimensional nature of the principal-principal conflict with multiple 
sources of conflict other than the financial returns interest. Fifth, future studies 
need to go beyond the board composition and structure to resolve agency issues and 
need to look into the influence of the director’s social and human capital on firm 
internationalization decisions [10]. Sixth, agency issue needs to re-examine in the 
born global firms in various institutional contexts. Lastly, state ownership proposes 
an interesting agency issue with two different principal-agent relationships and has 
different dynamics in comparison to the other owners.
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